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Abstract 
Nuclear forensics is a scientific discipline that aims to aid in criminal investigations concerning illicit use 
of nuclear and other radioactive material. The discipline aims to find signatures within the nuclear 
material that can help to find the attribution, or the origin and intended use of the seized material. 
Examples of signatures are isotopic composition, age and trace element content.  
The work presented in this thesis sheds some light upon limitations and possibilities in measurements 
of radioactive material using hand-held gamma spectrometric instruments commonly used by first-
responders or in early stages of a nuclear forensic investigation, i.e. in the detection and identification 
of the material at e.g. the finding place. One part of the thesis evaluates the capability of categorizing 
uranium using low-resolution gamma spectrometry and gives a plausible explanation to why the 
categorization may become erroneous. The second part investigates what kind of information that can 
be extracted from a simple high-resolution gamma spectrometric measurement of a strong 241Am 
source. 
The results show that categorizing uranium using low-resolution gamma spectrometry is a challenging 
task, due to the characteristics of these instruments. To make trustworthy categorizations of uranium 
based on low-resolution measurements, the properties of the sample as well as possible shielding 
needs to be known. The results of the investigation of 241Am sources show that there are a number of 
promising signatures, such as radioactive and stable impurities and age, which may be used to identify 
a source when other information about the source is unavailable.  
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1 ABBREVIATIONS 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
DU Depleted Uranium 
GC-MS Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry 
HEU Highly-enriched Uranium 
HPGe High Purity Germanium 
ICP-MS Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectrometry 
ITWG Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group 
LEU Low-enriched Uranium 
MCNPX  Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended 
NFKMS Nuclear Forensics Knowledge Management System 
NNFL National Nuclear Forensics Library 
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NU Natural Uranium 
ROI Region of Interest 
SEM/EDS Scanning Electron Microscope with Energy Dispersive X-ray Spectroscopy 
SIMS Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry 
TEM Transmission Electron Microscopy 
TIMS Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry 
VGSL Virtual Gamma Spectrometry Laboratory 
XRD X-ray Diffraction 
XRF X-ray Fluorescence 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear material has worldwide been under strong control for almost 60 years. The safeguards 
organization under IAEA has the main responsibility to ensure that states maintain accountability of 
nuclear material. Even so, there have been incidents where nuclear material has been found out of 
regulatory control [Wallenius et al., 2006; Wallenius et al. 2007]. The main part has been smuggling 
incidents but there have also been incidents where theft of nuclear material has been revealed. 
Whereas the safeguards organization is meant to prevent incidents involving nuclear material, there is 
also a need for imposing sentences upon individuals who have handled nuclear material illegally 
[UNSCR 1540, 2004]. The purpose of legal proceedings may be twofold; deterrence and retribution. 
The deterrence is directed against both individuals as well as against states. The complex production 
of nuclear material makes state involvement and a state’s knowledge of the presence of nuclear 
material production inevitable. A confiscation of nuclear material found out of regulatory control 
would imply that a state has failed to follow international law concerning nuclear material. This fact 
would reinforce a state’s will to control nuclear material and thereby deter from both negligence and 
proliferation. To help in these legal proceedings there has been a need for forensics that focuses on 
the information that can be provided from the nuclear material, to complement traditional forensic 
evidence. 
Nuclear forensic science is a scientific discipline that has been developing for the last 20 years or so. 
The aim of nuclear forensics is to aid criminal investigations of nuclear material or other radioactive 
material to find the attribution, or the origin and intended use of the seized material. Commonly, the 
investigated material is nuclear material such as uranium and plutonium, but also radioactive sources 
may be subject of investigation. Furthermore, there are other radionuclides, such as 241Am, that are 
fissionable and hence sometimes referred to as alternative nuclear material [IAEA, 2002]. Many of the 
methods used in nuclear forensics are based on methods used in other disciplines such as age dating 
and lanthanide analysis which are methods commonly employed in geology [Cheong et al., 2015; 
Lobato et al., 2015]. One difference in nuclear forensics compared to geology is the need for a different 
time scale for age dating in nuclear forensics. Whereas the measured ages in geochronology may be 
millions or billions of years, the age of nuclear material is less than 80 years. This time scale requires 
other chronometers to provide low measurement uncertainties. 
The objective of the work presented in this thesis has been to shed some light upon limitations and 
possibilities in measurements of radioactive material using hand-held gamma spectrometric 
instruments commonly used by first-responders or in early stages of a nuclear forensic investigation, 
i.e. in the detection and identification of the material at e.g. the finding place. The first paper shows 
some of the difficulties in categorizing uranium using low-resolution gamma spectrometry and the 
possibility of making erroneous decisions based on the measurements. The second paper shows what 
kind of information that can be extracted from a simple high-resolution gamma spectrometric 
measurement of a strong radioactive source. This information could be included in a National Nuclear 
Forensics Library to help identify a radioactive source found out of regulatory control. 
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3 BACKGROUND 
3.1 Political history of nuclear development 
In 1938 Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann irradiated uranium with neutrons and discovered that one 
resulting entity from the irradiations was barium, but they could not explain how this was possible 
[Hahn and Strassmann, 1939]. Shortly after, Lise Meitner and her nephew Otto Frisch devised the 
theoretical explanation that the neutron irradiation split the uranium atom into two nuclei of roughly 
equal size and that energy is released in the process [Meitner and Frisch, 1939]. Fission was discovered 
and shortly after this it was found that the neutrons produced in the fission could cause a chain 
reaction [Zinn and Szilard, 1939]. In 1940 Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch wrote an article on the 
possibility to build “super-bombs” using uranium enriched in 235U [Arnold, 2003], and July 16 1945 the 
first nuclear test, the “Trinity” test, was conducted. The test was followed by the atomic bombs over 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki shortly after. Soon, technical details on the construction of the atomic bomb 
leaked to the Soviet Union, and when the Soviet Union had implemented the nuclear weapons 
technology in 1949, when the first Soviet test was conducted, the nuclear arms race became a part of 
the Cold War.  
The IAEA was established in 1957 after the “Atoms for Peace” initiative by the US president Dwight D. 
Eisenhower to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and to prevent nuclear material to be used for 
military purposes [Fischer, 1997]. The idea was that the IAEA would serve as a bank for nuclear 
material. A safeguards organization was created to ensure that nuclear material was not used for 
military purposes. However, the Cold War prevented the implementation of the IAEA as a nuclear 
material protector. Instead, while the nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes spread 
across the world, so did the nuclear weapons technology. For example, the plutonium used for the 
Indian nuclear weapons programme was produced in a research reactor supplied by Canada [Fischer, 
1997]. By 1968, five countries around the world had nuclear weapons technology and, furthermore, 
conducted nuclear weapons tests. It became clear that the spread of this knowledge and technology 
should be stopped. In 1970 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force.  
The NPT can be described as having three pillars; non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of 
nuclear technology. The first part, non-proliferation, obligates the nuclear weapons states not to share 
nuclear weapons or technology related to nuclear weapons to states that do not have nuclear 
weapons. On the other hand, non-nuclear weapons states are obligated not to receive or develop 
nuclear weapons technology. Also, non-nuclear states are obligated to accept IAEA safeguards to verify 
that the nuclear technology within the state is used for peaceful purposes. The safeguards organization 
maintains credible assurance that nuclear material under safeguards is used for peaceful aims and is 
not converted into nuclear weapons [NPT/CONF.2015/13, 2015]. The second pillar, disarmament, 
implies that the nuclear weapons states are obligated to pursue the complete disarmament of nuclear 
weapons, and the third pillar gives the states the right to develop and use nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes, e.g. nuclear energy [Reed and Stillman, 2009]. After the implementation of the 
NPT, still a few states have developed and tested nuclear weapons. After the disassembly of the Soviet 
Union there were suddenly three new nuclear weapons states. However, these three states, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine, soon transferred their stock of nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation 
[Reed and Stillman, 2009]. In the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, seizures of illicit 
radiological and nuclear material at borders started to increase rapidly. IAEA recorded more than 2150 
incidents of illicit trafficking of radioactive material between 1993 and 2011. Of these, more than 400 
cases concerned depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NU) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) and 
about 16 concerned highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium [Hutcheon et al., 2013].  
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To handle events with nuclear material and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, the 
IAEA has established a nuclear security programme. This programme focuses on prevention and 
detection of and response to criminal or other unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive 
material [IAEA, 2011]. The IAEA recommends each state to implement a nuclear security infrastructure 
to protect nuclear and radioactive material within its borders. The state should also have the ability to 
“prevent, detect and respond to nuclear security events” [IAEA, 2015]. The preventive measures 
involve deterrence, information security, and trustworthiness of personnel by the implementation of 
a “nuclear security culture”. The detection measures should involve detection by instruments as well 
as information alerts. The response measures involve the actions that follow a detected nuclear 
security event and includes notification and activation of all relevant authorities including the initiation 
of investigations concerning the event. For the purpose of both deterrence and response, nuclear 
forensics plays an important part.  
3.2 Nuclear forensics 
Nuclear forensics is a relatively new scientific discipline.  The aim of nuclear forensics is to find the 
attribution of unknown nuclear and other radioactive material.1 The attribution assessment is used to 
determine the origin of the material, the intended use and the responsible individuals connected to 
the material [Hutcheon et al., 2013]. Methodology in nuclear forensics includes measurements of 
radioactive nuclides as well as stable elements. Some of the methods, such as age dating and 
lanthanide patterns, are also used in geology and archaeology. However, a major difference between 
nuclear forensics and, for instance, geology is the need for quality assurance to meet the high legal 
and scientific scrutiny [Leggitt et al., 2009].  Therefore a considerable amount of the conducted 
research focuses on improving the measurement precision and obtaining smaller uncertainties 
[Williams et al., 2014]. Nuclear forensics often combines laboratory methods used for ordinary analysis 
of nuclear and other radioactive material and interpretation of the analyses to provide technical 
conclusions about, for example, seized illicit nuclear or radioactive material [Kristo and Tumey, 2013].  
A nuclear forensic investigation can be divided into three parts [IAEA, 2006]: 
- Categorization 
The IAEA report “Nuclear Forensics Support” (2006) states that “categorization is used to address the 
threat posed by a specific incident”. The aim of the categorization is to identify the safety risk to first 
responders and to the public, as well as to evaluate whether the incident is part of criminal activity 
and/or a threat to national security. One example of categorization may be the interception of uranium 
at a border control. The categorization done at this stage could include gamma spectrometric 
measurements of the found material. Calculating the enrichment of the uranium would provide 
information to how to proceed with confiscation or even if a crime has been committed. 
- Characterization 
Characterization on the other hand handles the determination of specific characteristics of the 
material. Tab. 1 lists some useful techniques and methods and gives a recommended sequencing of 
analysis to give the most valuable information early in an investigation [IAEA, 2015]. The table is a 
                                                          
1 The IAEA states that: ”Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive material, or of 
evidence that is contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings under international or 
national law related to nuclear security. The analysis of nuclear or other radioactive material seeks to identify 
what the materials are, how, when and where the materials were made, and what their intended uses were” 
[IAEA, 2015]. 
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recommendation from the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), which is 
an association of nuclear forensics practitioners. Important nuclear forensic characteristics include 
isotopic and elemental composition and physical characteristics. The isotopic composition analysis can 
be performed using gamma or alpha spectrometry or any of the mass spectrometric techniques 
depending on sample size [Ramebäck et al., 2012]. The isotopic composition provides information 
about the intended use of the nuclear material but can also reveal if the material is reprocessed [Zsigrai 
et al., 2015]. Elemental composition, or impurity measurements, is the measurement of remaining 
metal impurities and can be used to explain the production process of the nuclear material or the 
geographical origin of the source material [Healy and Button, 2013; Varga et al., 2010]. Physical 
characterization is used to tell the grain size or the chemical phase of a material and is mainly 
performed using surface characterization techniques such as scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and 
x-ray diffraction (XRD) but also other, more basic techniques, such as weighing and density 
measurements [Sweet et al., 2013]. Another useful characteristic is the age of a material, i.e. the time 
that has passed since the last separation. The idea of age dating is to investigate the relation between 
a mother nuclide and the ingrowth of a daughter nuclide [Eppich et al., 2013; Gehrke and East, 2000; 
Nygren et al., 2007; Ramebäck et al., 2008; Varga et al., 2011]. The principles of age dating is explained 
in Chapter 4. 
Table 1 Suggested priority for common characterization methods [IAEA, 2006]. 
Techniques/Methods 24 h One week Two months 
Radiological Estimated total activity   
 Dose rate (α, β, γ, n)   
 Surface contamination   
Physical Visual inspection SEM/EDS TEM (EDX) 
 Radiography XRD  
 Photography   
 Weight   
 Dimensions   
 Optical microscopy   
 Density   
Traditional forensics Fingerprints, fibres   
Isotope analysis Gamma spectrometry Mass spectrometry  Radiochemical  
 Alpha spectrometry (SIMS, TIMS, ICP-MS) separation 
Elemental/chemical analysis  ICP-MS GC-MS 
  XRF  
  Assay (Titration, IDMS)  
 
- Nuclear Forensic Interpretation 
Besides the analysis of nuclear and other radioactive material, another important part of nuclear 
forensics is the interpretation of the analytical results. Nuclear forensic analysis can be divided into 
two groups; comparative and predictive analysis [Hutcheon et al., 2013]. A measurement technique or 
a measurand can be used both for comparative and predictive analysis, depending on the question.  
The comparative analyses can be used to answer the questions “Do these materials have the same 
origin?” or “Does this material correspond to any material in the database or any material we have 
knowledge about?” The predictive analyses can, on the other hand, be used to explain the origin of 
the material and the intended use. So, for example, the isotopic composition can be used to compare 
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different samples to see whether it is likely that they are coming from the same batch, but the 
composition can also be used to explain the intended use of the material and possibly the production 
process. Thus, the nuclear forensic interpretation is used both for linking materials and events to each 
other, and for the determination of the intent of the nuclear security event. 
3.2.1 National Nuclear Forensics Libraries 
The IAEA has recommended that each state should establish a national register of nuclear material and 
radioactive sources to ensure that nuclear material and radioactive sources are identifiable and 
traceable, or when this is not practicable, ensure that there are alternative processes for identifying 
and tracing sources [IAEA, 2004; IAEA, 2015]. Nuclear Forensics Knowledge Management Systems 
(NFKMS) is a concept that handles these issues, ranging from subject matter experts to databases 
containing information regarding domestic nuclear and other radioactive material. These are 
sometimes called National Nuclear Forensics Libraries (NNFL). The purpose of the library is to provide 
information to determine the origin and history of radioactive or nuclear material which has fallen out 
of regulatory control, to support nuclear security and non-proliferation. A library can be used to 
determine the likelihood that, e.g. an orphan source or seized nuclear material is originating from the 
state where it is found or whether it belongs to another state [IAEA, 2015]. The library may contain 
analysis information that can be used for comparison with data from analyses in nuclear forensic 
investigations, as well as information from manufacturers. It is also possible to include archive samples 
of different sources in the library to facilitate ad hoc comparisons of characteristics of an investigated 
material and samples in the archive [Wacker and Curry, 2011]. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Gamma spectrometry 
Gamma spectrometry is a non-destructive measurement method for gamma emitting radionuclides. 
The instruments used for gamma spectrometry can be divided into low- and high-resolution 
instruments. Low-resolution instruments such as NaI(Tl) scintillation detectors [Knoll, 2000] are 
commonly used as first-responder or customs instruments, but the ability of these instruments to 
identify radionuclides has been shown to be unsatisfactory [Blackadar et al. 2003; Nelson et al., 2011; 
Pibida et al., 2004]. This is mainly due to the low-resolution capability. The instrument is not able to 
separate peaks which are close in energy, which makes the instrument a blunt tool for identification 
and requires highly qualified users. However, this is not always enough since the resolution often 
prohibits even manual identification. High-resolution instruments, high purity germanium detectors 
(HPGe) [Knoll, 2000], do not have this problem. A number of publications have put forward different 
identification algorithms but the problem seems to remain [Estep et al., 1998; Hofstetter et al., 2008; 
Sprinkle Jr et al., 1997]. An advantage of low-resolution instruments is that they operate at room 
temperature as opposed to HPGe detectors which require cooling. The need for cooling in HPGe 
detectors somewhat limits its flexibility. Another advantage of the low-resolution detectors is that the 
acquisition is fast due to the high measurement efficiency since e.g. NaI(Tl) detectors can be produced 
with very high volume compared to HPGe detectors. 
3.3.1.1 Automatic evaluation algorithms 
Many hand-held gamma spectrometers provide the possibility of automatic identification of the 
measured radionuclides. Furthermore, some instruments provide the possibility of automatic 
categorization of nuclear material. There are different approaches to automatic identification 
algorithms. One common approach is template matching where a measured spectrum is compared to 
a library of spectra stored in the instrument [Burr and Hamada, 2009]. Another approach is region of 
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interest (ROI) monitoring, where regions of interest are monitored for elevated count rates. 
[Blackadar, 2005] One problem with template matching that may arise is that the sample 
characteristics such as density and sample composition may not correspond to the characteristics of 
the template spectra. For example, the measurement efficiency vs. energy for a dense sample is 
substantially different from a water sample so the peak proportions may be different which could lead 
to misidentifications. Another problem is the libraries stored in the instrument. The size of the library 
is a trade-off. If the library is too small there is a possibility that the instrument is asked to identify a 
radionuclide that is not present in the library. On the other hand, if the library contains too much 
information there is a possibility that there are several feasible options which leads to misidentification 
[Blackadar, 2005]. 
3.3.1.2 Simulations 
It is possible to simulate the behaviour of a gamma detector or a measurement of a specific 
radionuclide using a Monte Carlo technique. In paper I a simulation software, Virtual Gamma 
Spectrometry Laboratory (VGSL) was used to construct detector response functions depending on 
shielding and sample material [Plenteda, 2002]. VGSL uses a modified version of MCNPX as transport 
simulation engine [Waters, 2002]. 
3.3.2 Impurities 
Whenever a radioactive source or nuclear material is produced, elements different from the wanted 
radionuclide are present [Peńkin et al., 2015; Gehrke, 1998]. Some of the elements originate from the 
raw material [Švedkauskaitė-LeGore et al., 2007], some are introduced as contaminants during the 
manufacturing process [Healy and Button, 2013] and some elements are added as additives to enhance 
the performance of the material [Cudrnak and Necas, 2011] or added simply as support material. The 
impurities can be both radioactive and stable. These impurities can be used for characterization of a 
material, both for comparative analyses and predictive analyses. In paper II, the gamma signature that 
originates from the neutron activation of most probably support material in 241Am-sources are 
investigated.  
Neutron sources are constructed in a way that the alpha particle from an alpha-emitting radionuclide 
such as 241Am or 210Po reacts with a low-Z element, commonly beryllium, and a neutron is emitted from 
the low-Z element nucleus. For low-Z elements the Coulomb barrier is sufficiently small to make a 
nuclear reaction possible [Choppin et al, 2013]. When the formed atom deexcites or decays, gamma 
radiation is emitted. There have been a number of studies on alpha particle induced gamma rays from 
nuclear reactions in light elements [Lappalainen et al., 1983; Sastri and Schelhaas, 1985; Fazzari et al., 
2003; Martin, 1975]. This signature is investigated in paper II. However, the sources examined in paper 
II are not neutron sources. 241Am is a common radionuclide for gauging devices and ionizing smoke 
detectors. 
Another impurity that is investigated in paper II is radioactive impurities. Since nuclides of the same 
element are very hard to separate there is the possibility that isotopes of the same element is present 
in a radioactive material, depending on mode of production. If, for example, 241Am is produced by 
separating americium from an aged plutonium stock [Comstock, 1981], there is always the possibility 
of presence of 243Am which is also formed in a nuclear reactor. The 243Am would in this case end up as 
an impurity in a 241Am source. 
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4 THEORY 
4.1 Categorization of uranium by gamma spectrometry 
Uranium can be categorized by evaluating the fraction of 235U of the total amount of uranium. Using 
gamma spectrometry, this can be done by using the 185.7 keV peak from 235U and the 1001 keV peak 
from 234mPa in the gamma spectrum, assuming radioactive equilibrium between 234mPa and 238U. Four 
months after separation, the activity difference between 234mPa and 238U is within the uncertainty of 
the gamma spectrometric measurement. Hence, radioactive equilibrium can be assumed after this 
period of time. The abundance of 235U, f235, is given by 
𝑓235 =
𝑁235
𝑁235+𝑁238
     (1) 
where Nx is the number of atoms of uranium isotope x. When the enrichment of 235U approaches 90%, 
the 234U abundance is around 1% depending on the history of the material [Nguyen and Zsigrai, 2006]. 
Therefore, the amount of 234U, N234, is, in this case, considered to be negligible. Furthermore, the 185.7 
keV peak is assumed not to be interfered by 226Ra. This assumption is made on the basis that there are 
no significant amounts of 226Ra in a processed anthropogenic uranium material. Moreover, the 226Ra 
originating from the background may be subtracted from the spectrum. 
The radioactivity of isotope x, Ax, evaluated from a gamma spectrometric measurement is given by 
𝐴x =
𝐶x,γ
𝑡∙𝐼x,γ∙Ψγ
    (2) 
where Cx,γ and Ix,γ is the number of counts and photon emission probability of isotope x at energy Eγ, 
respectively, t is the measurement time and Ψγ is the measurement efficiency at energy Eγ. Using the 
well-known relation 
𝐴x =
𝑁x∙ln⁡(2)
𝑡½,x
    (3) 
where t½,x is the half-life of isotope x,  and combined with Eq. (1-2) one acquires for the abundance of 
235U 
𝑓235 =
𝑐235,185keV∙𝑡½,235
𝐼235,185keV∙Ψ185keV
⁄
𝑐235,185keV∙𝑡½,235
𝐼235,185keV∙Ψ185keV
⁄ +
𝑐238,1001keV∙𝑡½,238
𝐼238,1001keV∙Ψ1001keV
⁄
  (4) 
4.2 Absolute and relative efficiency calibrations 
As the measurement efficiency of a gamma spectrometric system is energy dependent, the detectors 
need carefully performed efficiency calibrations in order to make accurate activity and isotope ratio 
measurements. This is normally done by using a calibration solution containing a number of 
radionuclides with known, certified activities and with energies covering the energy region in question. 
The measurement efficiency is given by rearranging Eq. 2: 
Ψγ =
𝐶x,γ
𝑡∙𝐼x,γ∙𝐴x
    (5) 
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Hence, the calibration spectra and the certificate information for each energy can be used to fit a 
response function by using an empirical equation. In this work the 5-term equation previously 
published by Ramebäck et al. (2010) where c1,…, c5 are constants and E is the energy: 
Ψ = 𝑒𝑐1+
𝑐2
𝐸2⁄
+𝑐3∙(ln(𝐸))
2+𝑐4(ln(𝐸))
3+
𝑐5
𝐸⁄    (6) 
In special cases, where the absolute activity is unimportant such as for isotope ratio determinations, it 
is possible to construct a relative calibration if there is a radionuclide in the sample with a number of 
gamma lines covering the energy region of interest. As the activity is equal for all calibration points, 
Eq. 5 can be simplified and the relative measurement efficiency for a certain gamma line is then given 
by  
Ψrel,⁡γ =
𝐶x,γ
𝐼x,γ
    (7) 
and the calculated Ψrel,γ can be used to fit Eq. 6 in the same manner. The advantage of using inherent 
calibrations is that the sample geometry is unimportant as opposed to absolute calibrations. The peaks 
used for the construction of an intrinsic response function for uranium abundance calculations are 
peaks in the low energy region for 235U and peaks in the high energy region for 234mPa.The condition 
for the fitting of the function is that the 234mPa peak at 258 keV is visible. This peak connects the low 
energy 235U peaks with the high energy 234mPa peaks and enables a fit of a function over the whole 
energy region, from 144 keV to 1001 keV. For high-resolution instruments this vital peak is visible in 
almost all uranium spectra except possibly spectra of very highly enriched uranium. In the case of very 
highly enriched uranium in the high-resolution case, it would be possible to use 228Th daughters to 
establish the response function if the material contains reprocessed uranium (232U) [Ramebäck et al., 
2010].  However, for low-resolution instruments this peak is not discernible and, furthermore, the low 
resolution reduces the number of discernible peaks for the fitting of the response function from eight 
to two or possibly three peaks. Hence the construction of an intrinsic response function of a low-
resolution spectrum is not possible.   
4.3 Age determination 
The time that has passed since the last chemical separation is referred to as the age of a nuclear or 
other radioactive material. The age can be assessed by measuring the relation between the mother 
nuclide and its progeny. Radioactive decay can be described according to: 
X1
𝜆1
→ X2
𝜆2
→X3
𝜆3
→…    (8) 
where λi is the decay constant for radionuclide Xi. The age of a material, t, can, in the case of two 
successive decays, be calculated according to 
𝑡 =
1
𝜆1−𝜆2
∙ ln⁡(1 − (1 −
𝜆1
𝜆2
)
𝐴2
𝐴1
)   (9) 
where Ai is the activity of radionuclide Xi.  
In cases where the half-life of the daughter X3 is substantially shorter than the half-life of X2, the X3 
activity will rapidly grow into secular equilibrium and equal that of X2. This means that X3 will decay 
with the half-life of X2. In this case it is possible to use the A3/A1 atom ratio together with the decay 
constant of X2 in Eq. 9 to calculate the age of the material. This may be convenient in cases where the 
gamma photon yield of X2 is too small to be detected with gamma spectrometry within reasonable 
measurement time.  
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5 EXPERIMENTAL 
5.1 Categorization of uranium 
5.1.1 Measurement setups 
A number of uranium samples with varying matrix and isotopic compositions were measured using a 
NaI(Tl) identiFINDER® (ICx, FLIR Systems, Inc., Wilsonville, USA): 
 Natural uranium (NU) as UO2 
 Depleted uranium (DU) as UO2 
 Low enriched uranium (LEU) with approx. 4% 235U as UO2 
 Natural uranium (NU) as an aqueous solution (certified reference material IRMM-184, Institute 
for Reference Materials and Measurements, Geel, Belgium) 
For the UO2 materials, data was collected for 60 s at a distance of 10 cm from the source. The aqueous 
reference material was measured for 600 s close to the source due to the low uranium content. The 
instrument gave a categorization after each measurement, and the measurement data was 
downloaded for off-line calculations. 
5.1.2 Simulations 
The Monte Carlo based simulation software Virtual Gamma Spectroscopy Laboratory, VGSL, [Plenteda, 
2002] was used to simulate the efficiencies for a selection of uranium materials and shielding: 
 Water matrix, ρ = 1,0 g/cm3 
 UO2 matrix, ρ = 11 g/cm3 
 Uranium metal matrix, ρ = 19 g/cm3 
 Water matrix with a 1 mm lead shielding, ρ = 11 g/cm3 
 Water matrix with a 5 mm steel shielding, ρ = 7,5 g/cm3 
The simulated detector was aiming to mimic the NaI(Tl) scintillation detector in the indentiFINDER® 
instrument. The simulated data was used to fit Eq 6. The enrichment of 235U was calculated for each of 
the spectra and response function using the peaks at 185.7 and 1001 keV for 235U and 238U (234mPa), 
respectively. 
5.2 Characterization of high-activity 241Am sources 
5.2.1 Measurement setups 
Five sources with the following measurement conditions were measured: 
 Source 1: Nominal activity 185 GBq 241Am, sealed source contained in a lead shield during 
gamma spectrometric measurement 
 Source 2: Nominal activity 185 GBq 241Am, sealed source contained in a lead shield during 
gamma spectrometric measurement 
 Source 3: Nominal activity 3.7 GBq 241Am, sealed source measured with 1.10 mm Cd shielding 
 Source 4: Electroplated 241Am source 
 Source 5: Ionizing smoke detector 
Source 1 and 2 were seemingly similar by visual inspection. Source 1-4 were measured at a 30 cm 
distance using a portable p-type high purity germanium gamma spectrometer (Detective-EX, EG&G 
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Ortec, Oak Ridge, TN, USA). Source 5, which was a smoke detector, was measured for a week using 
a stationary p-type coaxial HPGe detector (EG&G Ortec, Oak Ridge, TN, USA) in a lead-shielded 
laboratory setup. 
The intrinsic efficiency response functions were established for all spectra using eight 241Am peaks 
between 208 and 802 keV and Eq. 6. Using the response functions, the activity of 233Pa relative to 
241Am could be determined as well as the level of impurities compared to the 241Am activity. 
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6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Categorization of uranium 
The results of the instrument categorization can be found in Table 2. The instrument categorization is 
erroneous in all cases except for the depleted uranium sample.  
Table 2 Results of the automatic instrument categorization. 
Uranium 
type 
Sample 
matrix 
Instrument 
categorization 
NU UO2 DU 
LEU UO2 DU 
DU UO2 DU 
NU Aqueous LEU 
 
A plausible explanation to this phenomenon can be found in Figure 1. It is clear that the response varies 
greatly in the low energy region depending on shielding and density of the sample material. This means 
that if the instrument is set with a certain efficiency calibration, the evaluation of a spectrum will be 
erroneous if the sample characteristics differs significantly from the characteristics used to build the 
efficiency function. This is especially apparent in the low energy region and in the case of categorization 
of uranium, where a low and a high energy peak is used to calculate the abundance. A slight deviation 
in sample characteristics will distort the abundance calculation as the calculation of 235U will be 
miscalculated whereas the high energy 234mPa peak is much less affected.  Using a high density material 
response function for evaluating a spectrum of a water sample would result in overestimation of the 
amount of 235U, hence the automatic evaluation would result in a bias, in the form of higher 
enrichment. This is what can be seen in Table 2 for the measurement of the aqueous solution.  In the 
same way, if the material is denser than the response function used, the enrichment will be 
underestimated. This means that the accuracy of the categorization is strongly dependent on the 
efficiency response function used for the calculation by the instrument.  
 
 
Figure 1 Simulated response functions for the investigated matrices and shieldings. 
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The performance criteria according to ANSI (American National Standards Institute) for hand-held 
instruments require that instruments should be able to identify a number of radionuclides without 
shielding as well as with a 5 mm steel shielding [ANSI N42.34-2006, 2007]. In fact, when evaluating the 
acquired spectra using the response function corresponding to a water matrix with a 5 mm steel 
shielding the instrument categorization results in Table 2 are reproduced. Figure 2 shows the resulting 
abundance of 235U using the response function corresponding to water with 5 mm steel shielding, 
different sample densities and different abundances. The orange line shows the natural abundance. 
This means that an instrument with a response optimized for a 5 mm steel shielding most likely will 
categorize uranium as DU for materials with enrichment and density corresponding to the part of the 
lines that are under this line. Furthermore, by using the responses in Fig. 1 it can be shown that, in 
order for an instrument with a setting corresponding to an inherent 5 mm steel response to show that 
a UO2 material is low-enriched (2% enrichment), the enrichment in the material needs to be about 
15%. 
To sum up, as the low-resolution instruments do not take matrix and possibility of shielding into 
consideration when performing the automatic categorization, there is a great risk for misinterpretation 
of the results. This would be avoided by using a high-resolution instrument as an intrinsic calibration 
easily can be constructed for each spectrum. 
 
 
Figure 2 Apparent abundance of 235U using the response function, corresponding to a water sample with 5 mm steel shielding, 
as a function of density for different uranium containing matrices. The orange line corresponds to the abundance of natural 
uranium. 
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6.2 Signatures in 241Am sources 
An example of a relative efficiency response function that was established for each 241Am source is 
found in Fig. 3.  
 
Figure 3 Efficiency response function of Source 1. The squares are the 241Am gamma lines used for the response function 
construction and the triangles are calculated responses for 233Pa peaks. 
6.2.1 Age 
The calculated ages of the sources are shown in Table 3. The peaks at 323 and 312 keV were used for 
241Am and 233Pa, respectively. The uncertainty was calculated according to ISO: Guide to the expression 
of Uncertainty in Measurement (1995). The combined uncertainty consists of contributions from 
counting statistics, decay constants, photon emission probabilities and the response functions. The 
uncertainty of the response function was estimated using the jackknife procedure [Miller, 1974; 
Ramebäck et al., 2010]. It is also possible to calculate the age by considering the efficiency to be 
constant between the 323 and 312 keV peaks, thereby neglecting the measurement efficiency in the 
calculation. This will almost always lead to a bias.  In this study, however, the difference between this 
method and the calculation method including the efficiency function is well within the measurement 
uncertainty. Hence, this alternative method can be used as a “quick and dirty”-method. 
Table 3 Measured and calculated ages of the five sources. The age refers to the age at the time of measurement. The calculated 
separation dates are derived from the age. Uncertainties are presented with a coverage factor k=2, which corresponds to an 
approximate 95% confidence interval. 
Source Age [y] Uc [y] k=2 Separation date 
Source 1 31.4 2.0 1982-01-06 
Source 2 40.8 2.6 1972-07-18 
Source 3 43.9 3.6 1969-07-06 
Source 4 12.2 2.3 2001-06-25 
Source 5 21.5 6.9 1985-07-09 
 
The age of Source 4 was known as the material for the source was separated and electroplated at 
Chalmers in 2001. Hence, its age is in good agreement with the calculated age. 
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6.2.2 Impurities 
6.2.2.1 Low-Z elements 
The spectra from Source 1-3 show a number peaks that do not match peaks of 241Am or its progeny. 
Most of these peaks have an odd non-gaussian shape. The peaks seem to consist of two peaks; one 
part narrow and one part that is broadened at the base of the peak, see Figure 4. This peak broadening 
is known as Doppler broadening. Doppler broadening occurs when an atom is excited by capturing an 
incoming particle. This collision puts the formed atom in motion and if the atom de-excites while still 
in motion, the registered photons will form a broadened peak. A common example is the 511 keV 
annihilation peak. This peak is a result from the annihilation process when a positron, emitted during 
positron decay, and an electron interact and disappear and two 511 keV photons are emitted and 
detected. As neither the positron nor the electron is completely at rest at the annihilation, the 
annihilation peak is Doppler broadened since one of the photons will have a slightly larger energy than 
511 keV and the other slightly smaller as a consequence of the resultant momentum [Gilmore, 2008]. 
 
Figure 4 Example of Doppler broadened peaks. 
The Doppler broadened peaks are a sign that there are low-Z elements and nuclear reactions taking 
place within these sources [Gehrke et al., 2003; Catz and Amiel, 1967]. The probability that a nuclear 
reaction will occur depends on the energy of the alpha particle. The energy must be high enough to 
penetrate the potential barrier caused by the Coulomb repulsion between the two positively charged 
nuclei. The barrier height increases with the atomic number. Hence, there is a limit to how heavy the 
target atom can be to be affected by a nuclear reaction. Therefore reactions are limited to elements 
with approx. Z<20 for most alpha emitters [Martin, 1975]. Neutron measurements confirmed the 
presence of neutrons in Source 1-3. Source 4-5 are sources electroplated on steel discs, hence there 
are no low-Z elements present. Accordingly, the spectra do not show any broadened peaks due to the 
Doppler Effect. The deceleration time of 26Mg and 29Si nuclei in an 241Am source was calculated to vary 
from approx. 400 fs to 500 fs for 26Mg and from approx. 350 fs to 450 fs for 29Si [Vesterlund et al., 
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2015]. This means that if the de-excitation half-life of an excited atom is shorter than about 500 fs, the 
decay will add to the broadened part of the peak. Suggested reactions and related gamma lines are 
presented in Figure 5. Some of the lines could be attributed to 23Na, see Figure 5. It is suggested that 
the sources consist of a core made from fused glass which would explain the presence of sodium. Other 
spectrum peaks correspond to reactions on 26Mg. Whether the magnesium is present in the 
encapsulation or has been built up from the 23Na(α,p)26Mg reaction is difficult to tell. One way of 
knowing is to look at the presence of peaks of other magnesium isotopes and see if the magnesium is 
of natural composition, but unfortunately these peaks are not exclusive to magnesium. 
Another possible signature is to look at the relation between sodium and 241Am in the sample sources. 
The 440 keV peak originating from the 23Na(,’)23Na reaction could be used for this purpose. To 
estimate the sodium impurity level the ratio between the relative activities at 440 keV and 619 keV 
was calculated according to 
𝑅𝑁𝑎/𝐴𝑚 =
𝑆440
Ψ440
⁄
𝑆619
Ψ619
⁄
   (10) 
where SE and ΨE is the peak area and measurement efficiency at energy E keV, respectively. The 440 
keV sodium peak is interfered by two weak 241Am gamma lines. These contributions were subtracted 
using the peak area at 619 keV. 
Table 4 Ratios of measurement efficiency corrected peak areas at 440 and 619 keV. Uncertainties are presented with a 
coverage factor k=2, which corresponds to an approximate 95% confidence interval. 
 
RNa/Am Uc, k=2 
Source 1 0.1854 0.0098 
Source 2 0.260 0.014 
Source 3 0.286 0.056 
 
The results of the calculations can be seen in Table 4. One question that needs to be raised is the 
relation between amount of sodium and age. Will the sodium in the sources deplete due to the nuclear 
reactions such that the measured ratio changes with time or is the depletion so small that the change 
with time is insignificant within a reasonable timeframe and thus can be considered constant? This 
has, however, not been a subject in this work.  
Source 1 and Source 2 have the same nominal activity, 185 GBq. However, the results in Table 4 show 
that Source 1 and 2 have significantly different Na/Am-ratios. This could imply that the amount of 
sodium is higher in Source 2 than in Source 1. Source 3 has a higher ratio than Source 1 and 2. The 
reason for this could be that Source 1 and 2 have an activity and hence an alpha flux which is 50 times 
higher than the activity of Source 3. This could lead to lower sodium depletion in Source 3 and hence 
a higher ratio. Another reason may be that the initial sodium concentration was higher in Source 3 
than in the other sources. The difference between the ratio of Source 2 and 3 are not statistically 
significant, however. 
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Figure 5 Identified gamma lines from radionuclides other than 241Am and its progeny, and suggested reactions based on 
impurities. The radionuclides with an asterisk are emitting gamma rays due to de-excitation. The reference to the gamma 
lines and corresponding half-lives are taken from the Nudat 2.6 database (2014) unless otherwise stated. 
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6.2.2.2 243Am 
In two of the spectra, Source 1 and 3, 239Np could be identified. A comparison between a 239Np 
containing and a non-239Np containing spectrum from Source 1 and 2, respectively, can be seen in 
Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6 Comparison of Source 1 and Source 2. Source 1 show 239Np peaks as opposed to Source 2. 
The presence of 239Np could imply that these sources contain 243Am as an impurity as 239Np is the 
daughter of 243Am. The photon emission probabilities for 243Am gamma lines are, however, too weak 
to be visible in the spectra from these measurements. Since the half-life of 239Np is 2.356 days [DDEP, 
2015] 239Np is in secular equilibrium with 243Am. It is therefore possible to calculate the 243Am/241Am 
ratio. The 243Am/241Am ratio is 1.444(48)·10-6 and 2.09(11)·10-7 for Source 1 and Source 3, respectively, 
where the numbers in parentheses, which are the numerical values of the combined uncertainty, refer 
to the corresponding last digits of the quoted results. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The work on categorization of uranium shows that it is difficult to use low-resolution instruments to 
automatically identify the uranium category as the identification algorithm does not take the sample 
matrix and the possibility of a shielded sample into consideration. Even though a number of methods 
have been proposed in the literature over the years, the categorization ability of the commercially 
available instruments seem to remain uncertain. The results implies that if using a low-resolution 
instrument for categorization, the certainty of the results could improve if the instruments were 
equipped with a number of efficiency response functions for different sample conditions to make it 
possible to test different response functions. In this way the instrument could provide the user with a 
range of categories, making it possible to narrow down the number of measures following uranium 
detection in for example a border control. Another possible option, also depending on the knowledge 
of the sample conditions, could be to take the data offline and perform the data evaluation manually. 
It would then, however, be more convenient to use a high-resolution instrument at once, since these 
instruments have better capacity to perform the right category evaluation. 
The work on strong Am-sources shows that information found inherent in the sources have good 
potential to be used as signatures for sources containing alpha-emitting radionuclides and some stable 
material within the source, either as impurities or as support material. The work shows that all 
investigated sources could be differentiated between by using only one gamma spectrum acquired 
from each source. From each gamma spectrum the age of the sources could be calculated. In a couple 
of the spectra, traces of 243Am could be seen and the ratio between the 243Am and 241Am differed in 
these spectra. This information can also be used as a signature for a specific source. A third signature 
was the presence of low-Z elements in the source which together with the alpha-particles generate 
nuclear reactions within the sources which are seen as Doppler broadened peaks in the spectra. 
Varying composition of stable elements in sources would provide different nuclear reactions and hence 
different peaks in the gamma spectra. All this information could be used to populate a national nuclear 
forensic library which would make it possible to, if not single out a specific source, at least narrow 
down the number of candidates in the case of a source out of regulatory control. 
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8 FUTURE WORK 
The continuing work will move on from signatures found by gamma spectrometry measurements to 
signatures in uranium, measureable by ICP-MS. ICP-MS provides the possibility to measure low or 
ultra-low concentrations of stable isotopes or long-lived radioactive isotopes. Stable elements are 
present as either impurities or as additives in uranium. To be able to measure these low concentrations 
in uranium-bearing material it is necessary to remove the uranium to avoid matrix effects in the plasma 
and unnecessary instrument contamination.  
One group of elements that is interesting as signatures are common transition metals that are used 
throughout the fuel production process as alloy metals in tools in different production stages or as 
production chemicals. This signature could provide information about the production processes the 
investigated uranium material has undergone. Another group of elements that are put forward as a 
promising signature for uranium is the lanthanides. These elements have similar chemical properties 
and are therefore considered to behave similarly throughout the uranium fuel production process. 
Hence, it is suggested that the ratio between the lanthanides, the so called lanthanide pattern, will 
remain undisturbed and therefore is a good signature for the geographical origin of the uranium 
material as well as the type of uranium deposit. A problem with lanthanide measurements with ICP-
MS are the interferences caused by isobars and polyatomic species such as oxides. The lanthanides are 
prone to oxide formation in the plasma which causes overestimation of foremost the heavier 
lanthanides [Vesterlund et al, 2014]. Therefore the future work will focus on developing separation 
and measurement methods for accurate measurements of stable isotopes using ICP-MS. 
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